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Any discussion of the factors shaping attitudes to, and patterns ofconflict over, new religious movements (NRMs) in Japan todayhas to be conducted in the light of the activities of Aum Shinrikyô.
For Japanese society, the “Aum affair” raised the spectre of a legally reg-
istered religious organization enjoying freedom of worship, legal pro-
tection, and religious tax exemptions and yet abusing these privileges
to finance the manufacture of chemical weapons and commit heinous
crimes.
Inevitably, the question of Aum’s position and continued existence
under Japanese law became a matter of public and political debate. On
the wider level, too, the Aum affair raised basic questions about the
relationship between religion, society, and state in a modern, liberal
society and about the extent to which such societies should offer protec-
tion to, and tolerate the existence of, religious movements that are in-
imical to normative social values. The affair also raised questions about
the tax benefits given to religious movements and about the ways in
which religious movements acquire their wealth. Such issues gave a pow-
erful boost to the development of an anticult movement in Japan and
gave added impetus to an aggressive mass media keen to expose “devi-
ant” religious groups. The Aum affair also damaged the ability of aca-
demics in the field to offer balanced judgments on new movements and
virtually silenced academic researchers in the debates that arose during
the post-Aum moral panic that gripped Japan.
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PARADIGM SHIFTS AND CHANGING ERAS: THE POSTWAR
CONSENSUS AND ITS ORIGINS
The Aum affair is a watershed moment in modern Japanese reli-
gious history, with scholars now referring to this as the post-Aum era
(posuto Oumu jidai). This new era has seen a paradigm shift in public
perceptions about the relationship between religion, state, and society,
with the consensus that existed from the end of World War II until 1995
being replaced by one that is far less favorably disposed to the religious
sphere. To understand this change one needs to look briefly first at the
factors that shaped the pre-Aum consensus.
The prevailing liberal democratic ethos upon which post-war Japa-
nese society and the Japanese constitution of 1946 were based viewed
religious movements as needing guaranteed protection from the possi-
bilities of state intrusion and oppression. This viewand the resulting
constitutional and legal safeguardswere a direct response to the re-
pressive policies of pre-1945 Japan. These policies had transformed
Shintô into a state religion centered on the Emperor as a unifying sym-
bol of the nation and used this state religion to justify Japan’s colonial
and war-mongering policies. As Japan descended in the 1930s into its
“black valley” (kurodani) of fascism and militarism, those who raised dis-
senting voices were invariably suppressed.
One movement so suppressed was the highly successful millenarian
new religion, Ômotokyô, whose leader Deguchi Ônisaburô1 portrayed
himself as a world savior while symbolically challenging the sacred sta-
tus of the Emperor. Twice, in 1921 and most severely in 1935, Ômotokyô
was subjected to police raids, the incarceration of its leaders, and the
razing of its religious centers. By responding to Deguchi’s challenges
and crushing Ômotokyô, the state displayed its readiness to use force
against any religion that opposed its ideology or threatened its power.
Hereafter most religious movements in Japancowed either by fear of
repression or motivated by a culturally and religiously ordained ideol-
ogy of nationalismfell into line with government dictates and with
Japan’s ideologically driven military expansion.2  The few that did not
were suppressed and their leaders imprisoned.
After Japan’s defeat in 1945 the American-dominated Occupation
government promulgated a new, liberal constitution. Recognizing that
religious repression had been crucial to the rise of fascism, the govern-
ment implemented laws and constitutional articles formally separating
religion and state, affording the right of freedom of religion to all, and
granting religious organizations protection from state interference.
These notions of individual religious freedom and the rights of reli-
gious groups became basic foundations for the modern, secular, liberal
democratic state that emerged after the war.
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Such constitutionally guaranteed religious freedoms did not neces-
sarily transform Japan into a haven of religious tolerance. While free
from the fear of state repression, religious movements found themselves
subject to scrutiny (and frequent hostile attack) from the free press that
emerged after the war. Indeed, it could be argued that the mass media
in general took upon itself the role of public policeman of religious
movements, publishing numerous exposés of religious organizations for
financial irregularities and other scandals. While the media delighted
in reporting misdeeds across the religious spectrum, from the financial
misdeeds of Buddhist temples to the closet right-wing nationalist politi-
cal associations of certain Shintô shrines, it was the new religions that
bore the brunt of such criticism. They were frequently portrayed as du-
bious organizations intent on manipulating and cheating the gullible
masses of their money.
Nevertheless, until 1995, religious movements were largely free from
external intrusion. The civil authorities, fearful that any such action
would be seen as an attempt to turn the clock back, rarely looked into
the affairs of groups that were registered under the Japanese Religious
Corporations Law, even when evidence of malpractice existed. This atti-
tude helped Aum; although widely suspected of numerous crimes prior
to the subway attack, it was not properly investigated, largely because
the police feared being accused of breaching constitutional safeguards
against religious persecution.
CONSENSUS SHATTERED
This consensus was effectively shattered in March 1995 when public
opinion and political necessity demanded a decisive police response to
Aum’s atrocities. That responseincluding mass raids on Aum centers
and prominent displays of weapons, shields, and other military
equipmentaroused for some observers disturbing parallels to the pre-
war militaristic assaults on Ômotokyô. The general public, however, fully
supported the raids, turning a blind eye to any possible breaches of the
civil liberties of Aum members and widely agreeing with the arrests,
trials, and sentences (including several death sentences) passed on Aum
leaders.
It was not just the immediate trauma of the Aum affair that affected
public opinion and convinced the political authorities that they had to
react. It was also the revelations that Aum had gathered a large amount
of materials and weapons for the purpose of committing further vio-
lence against the populace.3  This trend in public opinion has been a
major factor in shaping attitudes to new religions in the post-Aum era.
It has also encouraged the media to give saturation coverage to the Aum
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affair, endlessly reporting rumors, allegations, and facts, bringing in
numerous “experts” (mostly critics who denounce Aum as a nefarious
“cult”) to discuss the affair and its possible meanings for Japan, and
engaging in new exposés of Aum and other movements that mightin
the media’s perspectiveturn out to be “dangerous.”
Aum provided Japan with an example of what might happen if reli-
gious movements were left unchecked. In the popular view the affair
appeared to indicate that certain types of movements, especially ones
that, like Aum, preached a message of rejection of normative social mores
and values and that aspired to the formation of a new spiritual order,
might prove dangerous to society. The new consensus that has emerged
as a result is one which places less weight on the idea of protecting reli-
gious movements from the state, and which is more concerned with
protecting state, society, and the general public from the potential dan-
gers of religious groups.
POLITICAL AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO AUM
It was hardly surprising that the government felt impelled to amend
the laws relating to religious movements. Some rather anodyne changes
were made to the Religious Corporations Laws, while the question of
whether to ban Auman action that raised major questions about indi-
vidual religious freedomswas given serious consideration. A commis-
sion was established to determine whether Aum could be proscribed
under the Anti-Subversives Law (a repressive law implemented in 1952
as an anti-Communist measure, but never before applied to any move-
ment), but it decided that Aum no longer posed a threat to public safety
and hence should not be banned. This decision was greeted with relief
by liberals who feared that using this act against Aum would set a dan-
gerous precedent for future religious repression, but was resented by
many who saw it as an act of excessive tolerance toward an undeserving
movement. This was the view of the Japanese Public Security Intelli-
gence Agency, which would have overseen the use of the Anti-Subversives
Law against Aum, and which has since sought to persuade the authori-
ties to reconsider this decision.4  Its concerns, and those of the wider
public, were recognized by the government in 1999 when it passed a
new law (described by some as “draconian”) aimed specifically at Aum.
The law required the movement to keep authorities closely informed of
all its affairs and membership records.
Although Aum’s new leaders have tried to distance themselves from
their imprisoned guru Asahara Shôkô and his entourage and have de-
clared that Aum is now a peaceful movement, it remains suspect to the
Japanese public. Such is the continuing fear of Aum that wherever Aum
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members have tried to establish homes or centers they have faced pro-
tests from local citizens’ groups, landlords have sought to evict Aum
followers from their homes, and local authorities have refused to allow
the children of Aum devotees to enter schools.
Many of these actions have been illegaland have been declared so
by court rulingsbut public opinion and media sympathies are very
much on the side of protesters against Aum. As a Japanese friend living
in Tokyo told me, he wantedwhatever the cost to civil rightsAum to
be disbanded and its followers made to renounce their beliefs. He and
his family regularly used the subway and, although he was not person-
ally injured in the attack, it had left a strong enough impression for him
to fear that Aum still posed a threat to the well-being of his family. The
freedom to follow one’s own religion was secondary to the rights of
others to go about their business safely, a point that is readily under-
standable given the circumstances of the Aum affair.
Such perceptions have conditioned attitudes not just toward Aum
but to NRMs in general. Aum’s continuing existence provides a con-
stant reminder to the Japanese public concerning the potential dan-
gers that might come from certain kinds of religious movements. This
viewpoint has been widely articulated in the mass media which, never a
shrinking violet where new religions and hints of scandal are concerned,
have been emboldened to mount further high profile investigations of
potentially “deviant” movements. Equally, the police, whose earlier re-
luctance to get involved with Aum was quite conspicuous, have been
keen not to repeat the error, and have exhibited a greater readiness to
investigate scandals surrounding registered religious groups. When, for
example, allegations were made by disaffected former members against
Hônohana Sanpôgyô, a new religion which promotes costly divination
practices, and the movement became subject to an intensive media
exposé, the police began investigations which led to Hônohana leader
Fukunaga Hôgen’s arrest on fraud charges. One suspects that, prior to
the Aum affair, the former members would have been less vocal in air-
ing their grievancesor in demanding recompense from the
movementand the police far less likely to have intervened.
“DANGEROUS CULTS“ AND THE RISE
OF THE ANTICULT MOVEMENT
This climate of public hostility towards NRMs has been exacerbated
by the emergence of an “anticult” movement that has all but drowned
out alternative voices and perspectives. This movement, which barely
existed prior to the Aum affair, grew rapidly in its aftermath, spurred by
the activities of anticult activists from the United States such as Steve
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Hassan. Hassan visited Japan shortly after the subway attack to speak
about the practice of “brainwashing” in “cults” such as Aum.5  Such views,
which provided an easily grasped populist explanation of Aum, were
congruent with those of Aum’s critics who, prior to the subway attack,
had argued that Asahara and his lieutenants had exerted some form of
“mind control” over their followers.6  The subway attack appeared to
confirm, in public perception, the accuracy of such accusations, and
those who had spoken against Aum were consequently transformed into
“experts” not just on Aum but on “cults” in general. These critics be-
came articulate proponents of an anticult movement that was quickly
able to establish itself as an authoritative pressure group.
The workings of the anticult movement in Japanespecially its
rhetoricwill not be unfamiliar to outside observers. The term “cult”
(Japanese: karuto) has entered the Japanese language with very similar
meanings and connotations to the English media use of the term. Thus,
karuto in Japanese connotes a dangerous movement run by a manipula-
tive and fraudulent figure who poses as a religious teacher (but whose
real interests are power, money, and sex) and who “brainwashes” his
devotees into following his every beck and call.
While the term karuto was used in Japan prior to the Aum affair, it
has subsequently become dominant in public discourse. In this process,
the quasi-distinction made in many Western media discussions of new
movements between “religions” (genuine, upstanding movements) and
“cults” (evil, fraudulent, and dishonest) has become commonplace. Many
Japanese religious organizations have contributed to this perception by
affirming their respectability and commitment to normative
valueswhile simultaneously condemning Aumby giving their sup-
port to anticult campaigns, and by sending out warnings about “danger-
ous” and “false” (rival) religious movements.7
These perceptions about the dangers of cults have given rise to vari-
ous alarmist books and articles that seek to identify the “next Aum” (i.e.
the next group that might become dangerous and cause social disrup-
tion). One of the groups so targeted has been Sôka Gakkai. The move-
ment was persecuted for its opposition to the wartime government’s
militarism but it is now the largest religious organization in Japan. Sôka
Gakkai, more than almost any other movement prior to Aum, had pro-
voked public opprobrium because of its aggressive recruitment policies
and its strongly developed political base. These developments had caused
concern that Sôka Gakkai might threaten the post-war constitutional
separation of religion and state. Thus, it was not surprising that the group
was one of the movements labeled as potentially “another Aum.”8
Space does not permit further discussion of all the movements or
types of movement that have been tarred as “cults.” It is, however, my
suspicion that beneath the surface there may be a further disturbing
pattern of intolerance emerging in Japan. Based on various surveys that
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I have done of anticult literature in Japanese bookshops, the term “cult”
has been applied less to Japanese NRMs that have embraced the com-
mon assumptions shared within the Japanese religious world, than it
has to imports from abroad. Implicit in the term “cult,” in other words,
are not just ideas of being deviant but also connotations of “foreign”
and “not Japanese.” Here one should note that many of Aum’s charac-
teristics were drawn from external traditions (notably Tibet and India)
and that it adopted a self-consciously “different” (and inherently
nonnormative Japanese) style.
The two movements most frequently portrayed in such terms are
the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Unification Movement, both of which
have been active in Japan in recent decades and both of which have
acquired reputations for being socially disruptive and divisive. Both had
been involved in scandals and conflicts before the Aum affair, examples
including the Unification Movement’s alleged role in extorting large
sums of money from unsuspecting clients through aggressive spiritual
purification sales schemes, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ unusual teach-
ings concerning surgery and blood transfusions. Both, too, are seen as
“foreign” movements that infringe on Japanese social sensibilities by
demanding their followers’ full adherence. The groups are accused of
withdrawing from the normative round of rituals that are part of the
Japanese religious and social calendar and aligning instead with iden-
tity groupings that are in conflict with normative Japanese social values.
The apparent identification in popular discourse of these two move-
ments (and of “cults” in general) as highly deviant and dangerous was
illustrated for me during a recent visit to one of Japan’s largest book-
shops, Kiinokuniya in Shinjuku, Tokyo. There I found that books about
Aum were shelved not under “Religion” but in the section on criminal
organizations, alongside works on the yakuza (Japanese gangsters) and
the Mafia, and next to books on crime, serial killers, and mass murder-
ers. Perhaps, given that Aum had killed at least twenty-five people, I
should not have been too surprised at thisor indeed, given their re-
spective death tolls, the presence there of books in Japanese on Peoples
Temple and the Order of the Solar Temple. What took me aback, how-
ever, was that books denouncing the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Unifi-
cation Movement were placed alongside these. It was as if the book-
shop’s shelving policies had been determined by the agenda of the
anticult movement. It certainly reflected a disturbing pattern of think-
ing in Japan, in which deviance from norms in the religious context is
equated with the sinister and the murderous. I would also suggestif
my (admittedly rather fleeting) observations are correctthat the preva-
lence, in modern Japan, of Japanocentric modes of identity discourse
that are clearly anti-Western and anti-foreign9  has, if anything, become
intensified after the Aum affair, with certain movements identified as
“dangerous” largely because of their foreign provenance. These sub-
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liminal associations of danger, deviance, and foreign appear, in other
words, to be becoming alarmingly overt in populist discourse.
THE MUTED VOICES OF ACADEMIA
The emergence of the anticult movement as a force claiming au-
thority in the sphere of new religions clearly suggests parallels with many
Western countries. However, what is striking about the situation in Ja-
pan is that the voices of scholars who could provide informed perspec-
tives have become muted almost to the point of nonexistence. In part
this is because of the vociferous success of anticult activists who seized
the post-Aum high moral ground. It was aided by the misinterpretations
of a small number of scholars in Japan and elsewhere who appeared to
give support to Aum when it was first accused of criminal behavior. While
the American scholars who visited Japan after the subway attack to ex-
amine possible human rights violations against Aum were motivated by
a concern for human rights, their actions reflected a tacit assumption
prevalent among many scholars that NRMs accused of atrocities are
normally innocent. On this score, it was fascinating to note how differ-
ent interest groups involved in the sphere of “cult wars” in the United
States acted out similar and contrasting agendas in Japan over Aum.
Hassan and his fellow anticultists leapt to unsubstantiated conclusions
about brainwashing, and supporters of AWARE assumed that Aum must
have been a victim. This particular visit, coming on top of misjudgments
by two Japanese academics, backfired because of Aum’s swiftly proven
guilt. It also seemed to confirm the arguments made by prominent
anticult activists in Japan that academics are apologists for dangerous
and deviant groups.10
Only a very few scholars so erred, and most Western and Japanese
NRM scholars made no attempt to defend Aum or to do anything other
than interpret its criminal actions. Still, the prevailing image has been
of academic compliance with cults, with scholars who discuss movements
such as Aum in any terms other than those of cultic deviance and evil
seen as little more than apologists. It is small wonder, then, that at present
the opportunity for Japanese scholars to present an alternative to the
views of the anticult movement has been severely curtailed. Scholars in
many Western countries are certainly not unfamiliar with such scenarios
and are well aware that presenting other than condemnatory views on
NRMs can bring similar accusations. However, it is clear that the voices
of academics are to some extent now heard by civil authorities and law
enforcement agencies in countries such as the United Kingdom and
the United States. In Japan, on the other hand, there appear to be no
counterbalancing arguments in the debates over dangerous cults. This,
in turn, has intensified the hostile environment for NRMs in the post-
Aum era.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The above brief overview indicates that Japan has entered into a new
era in which certain types of movements (which, it should be empha-
sized, have never had a good press) have come to be viewed as increas-
ingly dangerous and suspect. The primary catalyst for producing this
climate has been the Aum affair, which has redrawn the picture of the
post-war religious world and reshaped the relationship between society
and religion. At present, the predominant trendswith a rampant press,
an aggressive anticult movement, a population ready to accede to dra-
conian laws against suspect groups, law enforcement agencies prepared
to investigate religious movements, and few alternative voices capable
of being heardpresage an inauspicious immediate future for emer-
gent religious groups.
Yet I should append a caveat to this gloomy picture. It is important
to note that the Japanese experiment with freedom of religion is still in
its infancy and dates only from 1946. Such freedomwhich includes
both the freedom of citizens to follow the religious paths they wish, and
the freedom of religious organizations to function without state
interferencecomes at a price and is dependent on an implicit con-
tract of trust. It demands that state and society should respect the free-
dom of religious worship, allow religious organizations to follow their
own beliefs and practices, and refrain from interference in such groups.
It also demands that religious movements show tolerance and respect
for the safety, freedoms, and views of others and for the laws of society.
The first major challenge to this fledgling democratic understand-
ing of religious freedoms came not from the state, the mass media, or
from anticult campaigners, but from a religious movement that was in-
capable of accepting criticism, enduring opposition or, indeed, tolerat-
ing internal dissent. After Aum, the authorities could have taken more
drastic steps or enacted even harsher laws against religious movements
and still gained public approval. Yet, even in a period of moral panic
and hysteria, this has not been done. The only repressive new law is
directed solely at Aum. Even so Aum has retained its right to exist, and
the courts have upheld the basic democratic rights of its members. These
developments indicate that, despite the current public mood, the Japa-
nese authorities remain committed to the tenets of religious freedom,
albeit in a more qualified manner than prior to Aum. While the previ-
ous consensus is now dead and while Japanese NRMs can no longer
enjoy the privilege of being virtually above the law, there are at least
some indications that whatever new consensus might eventually emerge
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